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In That Case, What Is the Question?
Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory
Richard Craswel
In his thoughtful essay, Eric Posner asks whether economic analysis has
failed contract law and suggests that it has.' Not surprisingly, I hold a
different opinion. That is, while I agree with much of what Posner says
about particular economic findings, I disagree about what it would mean for
economics to "fail" (or, for that matter, what it would mean to succeed).
More specifically, Posner argues that economic analysis has failed in
two respects, both as a descriptive theory and as a normative one.
Descriptively, Posner says, economics fails to predict existing doctrine:
Either existing doctrine differs from the rules that economics identifies as
efficient, or economics is too indeterminate to identify the most efficient
rules. And normatively, Posner says that this same indeterminacy also
prevents economics from making any suggestions for the reform of contract
law.
On my view, though, the descriptive and normative issues (and what
constitutes "failure" for each of these purposes) must be treated separately.
The descriptive claims that might be made for economics are largely
uninteresting, as most scholars have implicitly recognized. I will speak
briefly about those claims in Part I of this Response, but the bulk of my
comments-Part II-will concern the normative claims. To the extent that
normative analysis is at issue, I am much less troubled by indeterminacy of
the sort that Posner describes. I then address, in Part III, the very different
demands of what might be called an "interpretive" theory of contract law.
In short, my differences with Posner are largely over the question of
"what counts as a good theory" of contract.2 Posner wisely declined to
address that question-wisely, I say, because a full discussion could easily
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1. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or
Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003).
2 Id. at 831.
903
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
The Yale Law Journal
have tripled the length of his essay. My goal in this Response, though, is to
put that issue back on the table, for this is where most of our differences can
be found.
I. DESCRIPTIVE THEORIES
In the 1970s, in the early days of law and economics, much attention
was given to Richard Posner's claim that the common law (including the
law of contracts) was efficient.3 The elder Posner's claim on this point was
not so much that it was good for the common law to be efficient, but simply
that, as a descriptive matter, it happened to be the case that the common law
was efficient.
I should note here that it is not clear how many other scholars-other
than Richard Posner, that is-actually used this view in their academic
work. True, some authors tried to advance theories of the causal processes
that might tend, over time, to produce efficient rules, so these authors
presumably shared the belief that the common law was, in fact, efficient.
4
But the causal theories they advanced were not persuasive, and one of those
authors (George Priest) soon revised his theory and abandoned any claim
that it would support the evolution of efficient rules. Meanwhile, most
scholars who applied economic analysis confined their analysis to the
effects of particular legal rules, so those scholars had no reason to express
an opinion as to whether they thought an entire field of law (much less the
entire common law) was efficient.
6
Still, Richard Posner's more provocative claims attracted a good deal of
attention, and his descriptive hypothesis was often attributed to law and
economics as a field (or a "movement") rather than to a single author.7
Since then, however, this descriptive hypothesis has fallen out of favor, in
the sense that it is rarely discussed and even more rarely defended in the
legal literature. Part of the reason for this decline-I suspect a big part-is
the fact that Richard Posner himself eventually retreated from the strongest
3. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1 st ed. 1973).
4. E.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51
(1977).
5. George L, Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 409-15
(1980).
6. A possible exception can be found in FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (arguing that the general structure of
corporate law could best be understood as increasing wealth, but also taking normative stands
based on that premise).
7. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 276-85, 444 n.1 (1986) (discussing Richard
Posner's descriptive hypothesis as "the" economic theory of accident law).
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form of the hypothesis. 8 As I have already noted, it is not clear how many
other defenders the hypothesis ever had. But there were also substantive
problems with this purely descriptive use of economics, which probably
contributed to its decline.
9
For one thing, as Eric Posner notes in his essay, the descriptive
hypothesis (even if it were true) is not useful for predictive purposes.'0
True, the hypothesis can be cast as a claim that we can predict the content
of any common-law doctrine by figuring out what rule would be most
efficient. But there are plenty of other ways to figure out the content of any
common-law doctrine-by reading the case law, for example-so it is not
clear why we should want to predict something we can find out
independently.
To be sure, the descriptive hypothesis, if it were true, might have served
a legitimating or quasi-normative purpose, by showing that the common
law really did care about efficiency. After all, if common-law rules really
did track efficiency, it might be argued that this would justify the use of
normative efficiency arguments, at least in any normative system that
placed some value on internal consistency. Indeed, this potential use of the
descriptive hypothesis might have seemed especially important-both to
supporters and to opponents-during the early years of law and economics,
when it was still being contested whether efficiency arguments had any
legitimate place in the legal academy.11 But this battle is now over, in the
sense that it is (almost) universally permissible to discuss efficiency
arguments in law schools. That might explain why this potential use of the
descriptive hypothesis is much less salient today.
In any event, another problem with the descriptive hypothesis is that it
was never very clear what null hypothesis was being rejected. 12 In standard
hypothesis testing, of course, the researcher seeks not so much to confirm
the hypothesis under consideration but rather to reject some rival (or "null")
hypothesis. But what null hypothesis did Richard Posner's early research
reject? He could surely reject the hypothesis that the common law tends to
8. For a statement of his current, more nuanced position, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353-74 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE]. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
227-65 (1999) is also relevant.
9. Richard Posner himself surveys some of the problems in POSNER, PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 362-74.
10. Posner, supra note 1, at 852-53.
11. As Richard Posncr later put it:
One of the things judges ought to do is follow precedent, although not inflexibly; so if
efficiency is the animating principle of much common law doctrine, judges have some
obligation to make decisions that will be consistent with efficiency. This is one reason
why the positive economic theory of the common law is so contentious.
POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 374-75.
12. As Richard Posner later noted, much of the work in empirical economics placed "far
greater emphasis on confirmation than on falsification." Id. at 363.
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minimize efficiency-but since nobody seriously endorsed that position, its
rejection would not have created any stir. In addition, he might have been
able to reject the hypothesis that the common law is essentially random
with respect to efficiency. However, either of these conclusions would have
established only that the common law places some value on efficiency
without ruling out the possibility that it valued many other things as well.
And while that view (that the common law places some value on efficiency)
might have been controversial in the 1970s, it is not nearly so controversial
today.
By contrast, in order to establish the hypothesis that the common law
cares only for efficiency, we would have to reject null hypotheses for each
of the possible rival theories. For example, to show that efficiency predicts
contract doctrines better than do the autonomy-based theories of Charles
Fried,' 3 we would have to reject the hypothesis that individual autonomy
had any predictive value where contract law was concerned-or, at least,
we would have to reject the hypothesis that autonomy added any extra
predictive value over and above what could be predicted on the basis of
efficiency alone. But that hypothesis would be very difficult to reject, partly
because efficiency and individual autonomy often coincide, and partly
because Fried never operationali zed his theory at a level that would permit
predictive tests. As a result, Richard Posner's descriptive work could not
address the comparative issues that many scholars cared most about such as
the role of economics versus the role of autonomy, or economics versus
corrective justice.
So what remains of the descriptive hypothesis today? It is still true that
much work in law and economics proceeds without making full-blown
normative arguments, as most economists (and most lawyers) continue to
pay little attention to their normative underpinnings. Indeed, this absence of
explicit normative argument might suggest that most economic work should
be read as making merely descriptive claims.
In my view, though, this body of work is better read as (implicitly)
advancing a limited and contingent normative argument. That is, I read
most mainstream law-and-economics articles as saying: "To the extent that
you care about efficiency as a value, you should pay attention to the
following conclusions."'14 The normative claim in such an assertion is
necessarily contingent because most scholars (in most articles, at least)
make no attempt to convince the reader that he or she should care about
13. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION (1981).
14. In a relatively early article, Jules Coleman described this use of efficiency analysis quite
clearly, and noted that it best described the work of other early economic analysts such as A.
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell. Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 548-49 (1980).
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efficiency as a value. But for any readers who already do care about
efficiency-either as a sole criterion or just as one value among many-the
article will indeed have normative force. It will say, in effect: "To the
extent that you do care about efficiency, this is what you ought to do."
All of which is to explain why I am not interested in defending
economics as a descriptive theory of contract law, the topic with which Eric
Posner's essay is most concerned. 5 But his essay also criticizes the
normative uses of economics, and not just on the grounds that I have
already noted (i.e., that the normative argument is limited and contingent).
Instead, he argues that, even to the extent that we do care about efficiency,
economic analysis has still failed because it is too indeterminate to tell us
which rules to adopt. Accordingly, I now turn to that aspect of his essay.
I. NORMATIVE THEORIES
Posner's claim here is that economic analysis has become so complex,
and must consider so many offsetting factors, that it is incapable (in a large
number of cases) of determining which rule would be most efficient. This
implies that, even if we were to accept efficiency as a normatively desirable
goal, economic analysis would fail to tell us how to achieve it. For this
reason, he says, economics has failed contract law from a normative
perspective as well.
A. An Example of Posner's Criticism
Rather than discussing Posner's arguments in the abstract, it will be
more useful to consider a concrete example, which I take from his analysis
of remedies for breach. The economic analysis of remedies tells us that one
effect of a contract remedy is to give a party reason to pause before
breaking her contract. Roughly speaking, the bigger the damages she will
have to pay, the more reluctant she will be to breach. This observation led
some early scholars to endorse the expectation measure of damages, on the
grounds that it would deter breaches when (but only when) the breaching
party's gains from the breach failed to exceed the nonbreaching party's
losses.
As other analysts quickly pointed out, however, the full analysis was
more complex.16 If the parties could renegotiate-for example, if the
potential breacher could buy her way out of the contract for less than the
15. Except where otherwise noted, all subsequent references to "Posner" refer to Eric Posner,
not Richard Posner.
16. For a survey of the relevant literature, at least as it stood in the late 1980s, see Richard
Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 629 (1988). More recent work is cited in Posner, supra note 1, at 834-39.
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damages the law would make her pay-then the law's measure of damages
might affect the nature (and the cost) of those negotiations. The measure of
damages might also affect the extent to which the potential breacher took
precautions to reduce the likelihood of events that might force a breach. It
might also affect the extent to which each party relied on the contract (or,
equivalently, the extent to which each party neglected precautions against
the risk of the other party's nonperformance). It might also affect each
party's willingness to enter into the contract in the first place, especially
with trading partners who carried a high risk of breach. This latter effect
might also change the parties' incentives as to just how closely they
investigated their potential trading partners prior to signing a contract. The
damage rule might also affect the price that each party would demand (and
that price, in turn, might itself affect the mix of potential trading partners).
And since contract damages have much in common with insurance, the
law's measure of damages would also alter the levels of risk borne by each
party (which, in turn, might affect the extent to which either party
purchased private insurance).
Unfortunately, though, the remedy that would be most efficient in terms
of its effect on one of these variables need not be the one that is most
efficient in its effect on any of the other variables. For example, full
expectation damages might be best in terms of their effect on the potential
breaching party's incentive to take precautions against accidents, but
expectation damages are not the best remedy in terms of their effect on the
other party's incentive to rely. As a result, we cannot decide which remedy
is "best" in any overall sense (in.terms of its combined effect on all of the
relevant variables) unless we have some way of measuring the relevant
effects, both good and bad, and then summing them to come up with a
combined score for each of the possible remedies. But if we lack empirical
data to measure the magnitudes of the various effects, any such sum will be
difficult-or even impossible-to construct, so we will never know which
remedy is truly the most efficient.
This, at least, is the gist of Posner's indeterminacy argument. Before
turning to my response, let me say that there is much in this argument with
which I agree. Indeed, in some respects Posner may have understated the
difficulties, by limiting his analysis to complexities discussed in the
literature belonging to contract law. If we broaden our focus to include a
larger set of economic analyses, the complexity and difficulty of the task
only increases.
Just to name a few complications, picking an efficient remedy also
involves choosing the specificity of the remedial doctrine, or where that
doctrine should fall on the rules-versus-standards spectrum. The issues
involved in that choice may or may not be different in contract law than
they are in other fields, but they are still issues that have to be faced, thus
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bringing into play another balance of competing considerations.17 The
choice of an efficient remedy may also be affected by the extent of any
imperfections that might arise during the enforcement, including any
uncertainty as to just when that remedy will be imposed.' 8 The choice of
remedy could also affect the number of lawsuits and other litigation costs. 9
Also, since many contract defendants are insolvent (or bordering on
insolvency), the choice of remedy may also implicate any number of
bankruptcy concerns involving the interests of other creditors.20 And there
is always the possibility of other, "second best" effects to be taken into
account. For example, if we are ruling on supply contracts in an industry
that emits too much pollution, society might on balance be better off if
those contracts were made less attractive.21 Obviously, if additional effects
like these must be taken into account, it will then be even more difficult to
identify the rule that is most efficient overall.
I should mention here that, to me, this last feature of economic analysis
is a strength rather than a weakness. That is, if it is possible that some rule
of contract law might produce bad effects on the environment, or on any
other relevant factor, I prefer a method of analysis that will let me
investigate those effects and take them into account. True, this will
complicate the analysis considerably, especially since we will also have to
consider related questions about whether the environmental effects are best
handled through some change in contract law, in environmental law, or in
some other body of law entirely. But I would be much more troubled by
any method of analysis that, in its desire for certainty or closure, made it
impossible even to consider effects like these.
Be that as it may, we can now see why Posner's criticisms seem to
apply equally to both descriptive and normative uses of economics. If it is
too hard to determine which rule is most efficient, then economics must fail
at the descriptive task of deciding whether the common law is in fact
efficient. And if it is too hard to decide which rule is efficient, it seems that
economics must also fail at its normative task, at least if the normative task
17. For a good discussion of the economic considerations involved, see Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards, An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
18. For a recent survey of some of these issues, see Richard Craswell, Deterrence and
Damages. The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185 (1999).
19. For a theoretical analysis of some of these factors, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigaiion for the Level of Liability, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 151 (1988).
20. For a discussion of a few of these issues as they relate to contract law in particular, see
Jesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46 DUKE L.J.
517, 524-39 (1996). For a more general discussion on judgments exceeding the defendant's assets,
see Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986).
21. Compare Rock Island Improvement Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 698 F.2d 1075,
1077-79 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting that normal contract-damage rules could be construed differently
when public policy requires greater protection of the environment), with Schneberger v. Apache
Corp., 890 P.2d 847, 849-55 (Okla. 1994) (refusing to follow Rock Island).
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is to recommend the most efficient rule. This apparent similarity between
the descriptive and normative tasks is what enables Posner to write most of
his paper as a series of attacks on the descriptive uses of economics, with
the attacks on the normative uses of economics following on as a sort of
corollary.22
B. The Uses of Partial Analysis
This point, however, is where Posner and I part company. It is certainly
true that one normative task is to recommend the most efficient rule. At that
task, economics will indeed fail whenever an efficiency analysis is
indeterminate. But even when it fails at that ultimate normative task,
economics can still succeed in making useful contributions to the analysis
of individual pieces of the normative puzzle.
Let me return to the example of remedies for breach. To give Posner
the benefit of the doubt, let us stipulate (at least for the sake of argument)
that we do not know for sure which remedy would be most efficient overall,
once all of the various effects have been considered. Nevertheless, we can
still know a number of things about the specific pros and cons of any
particular remedy, which can help inform the ultimate decision about which
rule to adopt.
For example, the effect of remedies on a breacher's precautions is,
admittedly, only one of the relevant effects. But as long as it is one of the
relevant effects, it is still useful to know what that effect is. It is useful to
know, for example, that larger remedies will usually give the potential
breacher more of an incentive to take precautions, while smaller remedies
will usually give the breacher less of an incentive. It is also useful to know
that the strength of this effect will vary with the strength of other factors
that might already influence the breacher's incentives-for example,
whether the breacher already has strong market incentives to keep her
contract, or whether she instead sells in a market where reputations are
weak or nonexistent.
Indeed, understanding these partial effects can be useful even to
analysts whose normative premises do not rest on efficiency. For example,
judges or legislators who believe that it is ethically wrong to break a
contract might still want to know which legal rules will lead to a smaller
number of breaches.23 Similarly, judges or legislators who care about
distribution will want to know the effect of damage rules on the price
22. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 1, at 854 ("Rather than arguing that their models explain
contract doctrine, most authors argue that their models can be used to criticize or defend contract
doctrine. But the normative weaknesses of their models follow as a matter of course.").
23. Cf FRIED, supra note 13. While Fried believes that breaches are ethically wrong, he
(perhaps oddly) does not seem concerned with the effect of legal rules on the number of breaches.
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buyers must pay, and those who care about product quality will want to
know the law's effect on sellers' incentives not to produce defective
products. Thus, the value of what I am calling "partial analysis" is not
limited to those who take efficiency as their goal.24
In other words, the contribution made by partial analysis of a single
incentive is conditioned on two levels: It applies only to the extent that its
audience cares about efficiency, and-even then-it applies only to the
extent that they are considering one particular aspect of efficiency (in this
case, the effect of breacher's precautions). With those qualifications, the
contribution can be expressed as follows:
To the extent that you value efficiency (or, to the extent that you
value fewer breaches; or to the extent that you value fewer
defective products), and...
(a) to the extent that precautions by the potential breacher arc
relevant to this goal...
you should follow this analysis.
To be sure, a complete normative analysis would also include several other
aspects of efficiency (factors (b) through (z)?), to reflect the possible effects
on reliance by the promisee, on precontractual investigation, and so on. An
even more complete analysis might also include other normative premises,
depending on the particular analyst. But no matter how many additional
factors the full list includes, I still believe it is a useful contribution if
economics can clarify our understanding of any one of the factors on that
list.
There is a similar value in the partial analysis of most of the other
factors discussed in Section IJ.A (the factors whose number and complexity
so discouraged Posner). For example, just as it is useful to understand the
effect of damage rules on the performing party's precautions, it is also
useful to understand their effect on the promisee's reliance. And here, too,
greater understanding will be valuable not only to those judges and
legislators who care about efficiency but also to those who care about
reliance for other purposes.2 5 Similar points could also be made about
improving our partial understanding of the distributive effects of contract
rules, 26 their effect on litigation costs, 27 or their effect on insolvency
proceedings.
28
24. Coleman also makes this point. Coleman, supra note 14, at 550.
25. E.g., P.S. AT[YAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 202-12 (1981).
26. E.g., Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution
in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN, L. REV. 361 (1991); Christine Jolls, Accommodation
Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000).
27. See Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 19.
28. See Fried, supra note 20.
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To his credit, Posner does consider this sort of partial contribution, but
only briefly, in two paragraphs at the end of the first section of his essay. 9
His response is as follows: "This defense has an air of plausibility but also
distressingly open-ended and unambitious implications. The last decade has
witnessed a piling on of relevant factors, but no increasing clarity about the
function of contract law, and a wise judge might, in order to avoid
paralysis, simply ignore them.",30 I will return below to the question of
whether "a wise judge" would really be wise to ignore this sort of partial
analysis. 31 For now, however, let me focus on the earlier portions of
Posner's response.
One of his claims is that, while we have identified more and more
potentially relevant factors, we have not seen any "increasing clarity about
the function of contract law."32 This seems simply wrong, at least if by
"function" he means the effects of contract law. Indeed, greater clarity
about the individual effects of contract law is a perfect way of describing
what is contributed by the kind of partial analysis in which I am interested.
That is, by understanding more and more about just how contract remedies
can affect a potential breacher's incentives to take precautions (to continue
with my earlier example), it seems to me that greater clarity in
understanding those effects is precisely what we achieve.
I suspect, though, that Posner's main complaint about this sort of partial
analysis comes in the first sentence of the passage quoted above, where he
describes this analysis as "distressingly open-ended and unambitious. 3 3 If
to be ambitious is to aspire to a full-blown analysis that incorporates every
relevant factor and leads ineluctably to a definite conclusion, then this sort
of partial analysis is indeed "unambitious." And while Posner never
explicitly says that this is what he demands for a normative theory to be
successful-recall that he has set aside any question of what counts as a
good theory of contract34-it is only by comparison to such an ideal that
partial analysis must be judged a failure.
Now, to the extent that he is concerned with descriptive uses of
economics, Posner may be correct to demand that a descriptive theory
emerge with a final, overall answer before it can be said to succeed. After
all, if the descriptive claim is that common-law rules are efficient, that
claim has no content-and certainly cannot be rigorously tested-unless
and until the efficient rules have been identified. The inability to identify
29. See Posner, supra note 1, at 854-55.
30. Id.
31. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
32. Posner, supra note 1, at 855; see also infra text accompanying note 41.
33. Posner, supra note 1, at 855; see also infra text accompanying note 41.
34. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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efficient rules, therefore, could indeed be grounds for labeling a descriptive
theory as a "failure."
35
The demands of a normative theory, however, are different. While it
may be that the ultimate goal of a normative theory is to be able to
recommend a particular rule-and, of course, to justify that
recommendation-normative analysis can still be useful even if it falls
short of that ultimate goal. That is, if judges or other lawmakers have to
choose a legal rule (and they do), I believe it is better for that choice to be
informed by an understanding of the various effects that will follow, even if
that understanding falls short of being a complete algorithm for producing a
definitive answer. In short, while it may not be possible for a woman to be
"a little bit pregnant," I do believe that a normative theory can be "a little
bit useful."
Indeed, even to describe these partial analyses as "unambitious" seems
to me to misunderstand the nature of the problem. The problem, in a
nutshell, is that contracts (like most things the law regulates) are
complicated. They can be used for many different purposes, and produce
many different effects, and we are still a long way from completely
understanding any of them. From my point of view, trying to advance our
understanding in this regard-even if we proceed slowly and partially, one
step at a time-is still an ambitious project.36
I should note, too, that the humility that comes from recognizing how
hard these problems are is itself a useful contribution that economics can
make to normative analysis. For example, if we would otherwise believe
that it is easy to help poor consumers by striking objectionable contract
clauses, it must then count as a real advance if we subsequently come to see
that the problem is, in fact, much harder than it at first appeared.37 To be
sure, it is sometimes said (usually by critics of economics) that the early
users of economics in law were attracted by the hope of finding certain,
35. Many critics of the descriptive theory pointed this out years ago. E.g., Lewis A.
Komhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591,
624-27 (1980); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 115-16 (1987).
36. Jon Hanson and Melissa Hart recognize the difficulties when they describe many law-
and-economics scholars as "eyeballing the various efficiency considerations and offering their
own view, together with a smattering of contestable empirical support, of how the countervailing
efficiency considerations stack up." Jon D. Hanson & Melissa R. Hart, Law and Economics, in A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 311, 328 (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1996). Hanson and Hart observe that this makes the resulting analysis "less scientific," but they do
not conclude that economics has therefore failed the demands of normative analysis (whatever
those demands may be). Id.
37. Posner describes just such an example when he compares Philippe Aghion & Benjamin
Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
381 (1990) with Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, Judicial Modification of Contracts
Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their
Breach, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 230 (1993). See Posner, supra note 1, at 859-6 1.
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uncontroversial conclusions. 38 I have no way of knowing whether this is, in
fact, an accurate description of the motives of the early adopters, but, in any
case, it cannot be an accurate description today. To the contrary, the
attraction of economics for me is simply that it attempts to come to grips
with what are, in my view, the questions that really matter.39 As I see it,
shedding any light at all on those questions is a useful contribution, whether
or not we are able to produce a complete and definitive answer.
For similar reasons, I cannot join Posner's complaint that efficiency
analysis, as practiced today, is "distressingly open-ended. ' '4° By "open-
ended," I take Posner to mean that the list of potentially relevant economic
effects is never closed. As a result, even if the best current analysis did
seem to yield a definite conclusion-say, about what remedy was most
efficient overall-it would always be possible to overturn that conclusion,
if economists were to identify some new effect that altered the previous
analysis. To Posner, this open-endedness is troubling-as it should be, if
the test of a theory's success is whether it yields complete and final
answers.
On my view, though, this open-endedness is simply another
consequence of the fact that the subject we are analyzing is extremely
difficult, with lots of effects that we do not yet understand. Yes, this means
that we can never be certain in the answers we reach and must instead
regard every conclusion as merely provisional. As I have already said,
though, such certainty or "close-endedness" forms no part of my test for the
success or failure of a normative theory. As long as each factor that is
added to the analysis brings additional insight into a normatively relevant
factor, that makes the theory a successful one as far as I am concerned.
This difference between Posner's views and my own also bears on the
other part of his essay that considers partial analysis. While discussing
remedies for breach, Posner notes that "[a]rticles that discuss these various
incentives typically bracket most of them for the purpose of analysis and
focus on one or two. As a result, the optimal remedy derived from a model
is optimal only under narrow conditions.
41
As should now be apparent, in my view this bracketing of most
incentives (in order to focus more clearly on one or two) is a strength of
economics, for this is how we improve our understanding of any single
incentive. But Posner sets this benefit aside and immediately looks to see
whether the partial analyses can all be combined to reach what for him is
38. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 905, 905 (1980) (describing the "main attraction" of efficiency analysis as "the promise of a
single 'scientific' right answer").
39. I will return to this point-the question of what issues really matter in Section II.C.
40. Posner, supra note 1, at 855.
41. Id. at 838.
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the ultimate goal: the goal of identifying the rule that is most efficient
overall. Applying this test, he concludes that the models fail in this regard.42
C. The Dangers of "All or Nothing"
In short, I disagree with Posner about the appropriate test for whether a
normative analysis has "succeeded" or "failed," and with his implicit
assertion that the analysis fails unless it can proceed all the way to a final
conclusion about which rule the law should adopt. As a result, I also
disagree with the suggestion, made in passing, that a wise judge ought
perhaps to disregard the economists' partial analyses entirely, if only to
avoid paralysis.
43
I should add at once that Posner does not himself make this suggestion.
To the contrary, he states explicitly that he does not advocate that economic
analysis be abandoned," and in later portions of his essay he is even more
critical of most of the alternatives to economics.45 Nevertheless, Posner's
views about the "failure" of economics, if combined with other premises,
could yield exactly this conclusion (i.e., that economic analysis ought to be
abandoned). Indeed, I have occasionally heard similar views expressed by
students or colleagues, so the possibility is worth discussing even though it
is not Posner's own position.
On my view, the problem with disregarding economics (even partial
economic analyses) is that it throws away information about factors that
really matter. That is, if we care at all about how many breaches occur, or
about whether buyers overpay for products, or about any of the other
factors that economics studies, then it behooves us to know as much as we
can about those effects, rather than deliberately closing our eyes to them.
As Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell put it recently:
The world is complex, and empirical research on the legal system is
in its infancy, so this state of affairs [i.e., the need to make
judgments on the basis of incomplete or partial information] is
unavoidable. Implicit in the notion that this uncertainty (so-called
indeterminacy) constitutes a criticism of welfare economics is that
easily answered questions-which necessarily ignore relevant,
although complicated, features of reality-are somehow better to
consider.
46
42. Id. at 838-39.
43. Id. at 854-55. I quote the relevant passage in full in the text accompanying note 30.
44. Posner, supra note 1, at 830.
45. Id. at 870-878.
46. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 457-58 (2002)
(emphasis added).
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Perhaps another example will clarify. The field of industrial design is
also complicated, with many offsetting effects that must be balanced
against one another. Even if we confine ourselves only to the safety aspects
of product design, it is often hard to tell which design will best reduce
overall risks. Sometimes reducing one risk will increase others: For
example, making automobiles stronger and heavier may reduce the risk to
people inside the automobile, but may increase the risk to anyone in another
car that the automobile hits.47 Product design may also interact with user
behavior in unexpected ways, as when reductions in cigarette nicotine
levels lead some users to "puff' more intensely,48 or lead other users to
increase their smoking because they believe cigarettes are now safer.49 A
complete theory of product design would therefore have to include: (a) a
complete theory of engineering, capable of identifying all of the relevant
costs of any possible design; (b) a complete theory of user behavior,
capable of predicting the actual use that every design would receive
(including the distribution of different user behaviors across different
segments of the population); and (c) a full-blown moral theory, to tell us
how to make trade-offs among various kinds of risks. Needless to say, our
actual knowledge of product design has not yet reached this level.5°
Does this mean, then, that our present knowledge of product design has
"failed" us? Or, more to the point, does it mean that a wise designer should
"simply ignore" all of these complexities, for fear of being reduced to
paralysis? If so, what should the designer do instead? Should she, say, pick
a design that expresses some aesthetic ideal, perhaps on the ground that
aesthetics and self-expression don't seem nearly as complicated or as
"distressingly open-ended"?
Most of us, I think, believe that a designer would not be justified in
simply ignoring all considerations of product safety. Indeed, most would be
shocked by such callous disregard of human safety, and many would be
quick to award punitive damages if such an attitude were proved at trial.
The reason, of course, is that we believe human safety matters, and that it
matters a lot. As a result, even if we can never know exactly how best to
47. JOHN GRAHAM & JONATHAN WEINER, RISK VERSUS RISK 96-101 (1995). Some legal
and policy aspects of these trade-offs are discussed in CASS R. SUNSTErN, FREE MARKFTS AND
SOCIAL JusTiCE 271-94 (1997).
48. See the studies reviewed in John E. Calfec, Cigarette Advertising Regulation Today:
Unintended Consequences and Missed Opportunities?, 14 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 264, 265-
66(1987).
49. Brett Silverstein et al., The Availability of Low-Nicotine Cigarettes as a Cause of
Cigarette Smoking Among Teenage Females, 21 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 383, 385-87 (1980).
50. Readers who find it hard to believe that "technical" fields like engineering could ever be
indeterminate are invited to sample the relevant journals. See, e.g., Giuliano Augusti et al., Bounds
to the Probability of Collapse of Monumental Buildings, 24 STRUCTURAL SAFETY 89 (2002);
Pasquale Erto & Massimiliano Giorgio, Assessing High Reliability via Bayesian Approach and
Accelerated Tests, 76 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING & SYS. SAFETY 301 (2002); U. Neurader,
Investigation into Steering Wheel Nibble, 216 J. AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERING 267 (2002).
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promote the goal of human safety, we normally believe that it is worth
finding out as much as we reasonably can about the various costs and
benefits. In my view, the design of a legal system deserves almost as great
an effort.
To be sure, this argument will not persuade those who believe that we
shouldn't care at all about the efficiency of (some) legal rules. While I don't
agree with those arguments, those who believe them at least have an
intelligible reason for urging that economic analysis of those rules should
be ignored. In short, it is perfectly intelligible to argue that economic
analysis should be ignored if one believes that economic effects are not
normatively relevant.
It is much harder, though, to argue that economic analysis should be
ignored if those effects are normatively relevant. In other words, it is hard
to believe simultaneously that (a) economic effects are normatively
relevant, but (b) we should not spend very much time on economic analysis,
because it's just too complicated. If one believes point (a), that economic
effects are normatively relevant, then the only justification for point (b)
would have to be an additional belief that extra time and effort spent on
economics would simply be unproductive because the complexities of
economics mean that no useful insights would be realized.
This, unfortunately, is where the link to Posner's argument comes in. If
"no useful insights" is defined in an all-or-nothing way, as Posner appears
to define it-meaning that the only insights that count are those that yield
complete and definitive normative answers-then further time and effort
spent on economics always will be unproductive, at least as measured by
that test. The same test, it should be noted, would also deem unproductive
any further research into product safety. In this way, Posner's views about
what counts as normative success or failure could indeed lend support to the
conclusion that a wise judge should simply ignore economic analysis. On
my view, that would be a loss.
III. INTERPRETIVE THEORIES
Let me turn now to a third class of theories, which are neither purely
descriptive nor purely normative. For want of a better label, I will call these
"interpretive theories," recognizing that I am crudely grouping together
theories with as many differences as similarities. 1 While Posner refers to
these theories only briefly, 2 a slightly longer discussion may shed light
both on the proper uses of economics and on Posner's criticisms.
51. 1 have borrowed this term from Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE
THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 206, 213-22 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
52. Posner, supra note 1, at 877-78.
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Interpretive theories attempt to clarify or reconstruct the concepts used
in existing bodies of law, in order to "make sense" of, or give greater
coherence to, those concepts. In tort law, these theories are exemplified (in
very different ways) by the work of Jules Coleman53 and Ernest Weinrib 4
Interpretive theories are less common (or less well-developed) in contracts
scholarship, but examples can be found in the work of Dennis Patterson, 55
Peter Benson,56 and Stephen Smith. 7
One common feature of interpretive theories is that their authors adopt
a point of view that is internal to the body of law in question. That is, they
seek to explain the law's concepts in terms that would be familiar to judges,
practicing lawyers, and others who participate in actual legal practice and
institutions.5" These scholars thus do not attempt to evaluate a body of law
from the standpoint of some external normative premise, such as autonomy
or utility or anything else (what Coleman refers to as "top-down"
theories). 59 Instead, these theories start by accepting, at least provisionally,
the normative or quasi-normative concepts already employed in the cases
being studied-for example, fault and corrective justice in tort law, or
promise keeping and individual autonomy in contracts. Thus, the stated
goal of these theorists is not to justify or criticize the body of law in
question but merely to provide a better account of what that body of law is.
As a result, these theories cannot be classified with the explicitly normative
theories that Posner discusses.
53. E.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE]
(referring to his approach as a "middle-level" theory); JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS
7-12 (1992) [hereinafter COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS] (same).
54. E.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
55. E.g., Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 235 (1993).
56. E.g., Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW,
supra note 51, at 118.
57. Stephen A. Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE: FOURTH SERIES 107, 111 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000). Posner appears to place
Melvin Eisenberg in this category. See Posner, supra note 1, at 878 n.128. Eisenberg's latest
work, however, is explicitly critical of interpretive theories. See Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 213-
22.
58. As Weinrib put it:
The formalist treats the law's concepts as signposts of an internal intelligibility and
tries to understand them as they are understood by the jurists who think and talk about
them. The formalist, accordingly, regards law as understandable from within, not as an
alien language that requires translation into the terminology of another discipline such
as economics.
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583, 592
(1993). Formalism, in this context, is the name that Weinrib gives to his version of what I am
calling an interpretive theory.
59. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 53, at 8. Interestingly, Coleman uses an
interpretive theory (or what he calls a "middle-level" theory) to discuss tort law, but he uses a
more explicitly normative ("top-down") theory to analyze contract law. Id. at 9-12, 430-36.
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At the same time, though, these theorists aspire to more than merely
describing what courts do, so their theories are not purely descriptive either.
At a minimum, these theorists are describing the language and concepts that
courts use, not the actual outcomes of cases. They therefore aim for a
higher level of abstraction than would be achieved merely by reporting case
outcomes, even though a list of outcomes might be perfectly accurate as a
description. Instead, their concern is with "middle-level" concepts such as
consideration or reliance, rather than with brute case outcomes.
Moreover, these theorists also seek to connect the various concepts into
a coherent whole, thus revealing the underlying structure that is sometimes
said to be "implicit" in or "presupposed" by the legal concepts. As a result,
these theorists have some room to use normative theories in deciding which
concepts to emphasize in their reconstruction, so that the underlying
structure they reveal at least will be plausible in normative terms.
60
Interpretive theorists can also make limited suggestions for reforming
existing law so as to give it even greater coherence-understanding, of
course, that greater coherence with the law's existing framework is not
necessarily a good thing. As a result, this case for reform will be at best a
limited one, whose strength must ultimately depend on the moral
attractiveness (according to some external normative theory) of the
framework that the theorist has revealed.
The fact that any normative conclusions must ultimately draw their
strength from some external normative theory leads Posner to conclude that
interpretive theories are subject to criticisms that have been raised against
other, more explicitly normative, theories. 6 1 Not all of these theorists,
however, have as their goal the advancing of normative cases for reform.
To some, a better understanding of the law's own concepts is a worthwhile
goal in itself--or, at least, is a necessary precondition to any further
normative work-and interpretive theories are seen as a way of gaining that
better understanding. Stephen Smith nicely expresses this view:
Legal scholarship is done with various purposes in mind, but the
basic aim of legal scholarship is to understand the law better. Even
if our ultimate goal is law reform, we need first to understand what
it is we are trying to reform.... Understanding in law, like
60. 1 will skip over here the much-debated issues ofjust what kind of "coherence" is required,
and how much room that leaves the theorist to adopt interpretations that match his or her own
normative theories, or how much the theorist is instead constrained by the existing legal materials.
For discussion of these issues, see the various contributions to the Symposium on Legal
Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579 (1993), and the much more extensive literature cited
therein.
61. Posner, supra note 1, at 878 ("Ambitious doctrinal scholarship [Posner's term for these
theories] thus converges to a kind of moral philosophy that is especially sensitive to judicial
outcomes ...."). Posner surveys some of the criticisms of moral theories of contract law in
Section V.A of his essay.
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understanding in other areas of life, is achieved through making
sense of the object of our inquiry, through making that object
intelligible to us in a way it was not intelligible before.
Peter Benson puts it even more strongly:
[H]owever much competing contract theories may differ among
themselves, they all purport to be theories of contract law. They
presuppose, therefore, the existence of the legal point of view.
Indeed, if a theory were to ignore and not to take up, even
provisionally, the standpoint of the law, the law would rightly
dismiss it as extraneous and hence irrelevant to its own concerns
and analysis-however internally 63coherent, sophisticated, or
otherwise valid that theory might be.
This use of theory represents something fundamentally different from
either descriptive or normative theories (as Posner uses those terms). When
Posner refers to a theory's ability or inability to "explain" contract law, he
appears to use "explain" merely as a synonym for descriptive accuracy,
meaning whether the theory's recommendations match existing case
outcomes. But for interpretive theorists like Smith or Benson, a theory that
"explained" contract law in terms of some entirely external factor (such as
efficiency) would not count as an explanation at all, even if its predictions
matched perfectly with actual outcomes. Instead, the goal of these
interpretive theories is to explain the law's internal concepts and
categories.
64
I have described these interpretive theories not because I prefer them to
economics-I do not, for reasons too complex to go into here-but because
they raise even more starkly the question of what counts as a good theory of
contract law. In particular, they show that what counts as a good theory
depends on the uses to which the theory is going to be put, so it is best to be
62. Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO U. 241, 249 (2000).
63. Benson, supra note 56, at 124. Smith is more pluralistic in his recognition that other sorts
of theories can be useful for other legal purposes, including the purpose of law reform:
[U]nderstanding the law is not all that we do or should care about. We also care about
whether the law is just (valuable, good, desirable, etc.) and, if it is not just, how it
should be reformed.... The value of such scholarship is clear. But we should not
confuse such an exercise with the exercise of understanding the law we now have.
Smith, supra note 62, at 256.
64. Coleman expresses this goal as follows:
Whereas there is much to be said for positive [i.e., descriptive] legal theory .... this
book makes no predictions, derives no theorems, and is generally uninterested in this
form of explanation. It is interested in providing an explanation of our practices, or
important parts of them, but explanations that make sense of the practice in the light of
norms it claims are inherent in it, norms, moreover, that could withstand the test of
rational reflection.
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 53, at 7.
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explicit about those uses and the demands they make. In this case, some of
the criticisms that Posner makes of economics are also criticisms that an
interpretivist would make. And while Posner himself is not an
interpretivist-in fact, he criticizes interpretive theories, if only briefly 65-I
suspect that some of the rhetorical force of his criticisms of economic
analysis derives from the fact that those criticisms might well be valid if
economics aspired to be an interpretive theory.
For example, the open-endedness of economic analysis might well
count as a failure from an interpretive point of view. As I have already said,
from a normative point of view there is nothing wrong with acknowledging
that we understand some effects of contract law better than others, and that
while we hope that our knowledge will progress, we will never be able to
rule out the possibility of additional relevant effects that we have not yet
considered.66 From an interpretive standpoint, though, to admit that our
interpretation is partial and limited and that it probably always will be
comes close to admitting failure. After all, most interpretivists seek an
interpretation that will bring coherence to a field of law in its entirety, so if
there are aspects of that field that have not yet been accounted for, the
coherence of the theory as a whole will be weakened. In other words, the
coherentist aspect of interpretive theories may provide exactly that "all or
nothing" quality that Posner seems to accept but which normative
economics entirely lacks.
For the same reason, interpretive theorists would share Posner's doubts
about any form of partial analysis, in which the economist holds constant
most relevant variables and institutions in order to focus on just one or two.
For example, an economist would see nothing strange in taking as given the
structure of private litigation (one plaintiff and one defendant), and asking
what substantive rule would be best given the costs and other consequences
of the current enforcement structure. The economist would not thereby be
endorsing the current enforcement structure, of course, but would merely be
leaving to another day all questions about the optimal structure of
enforcement. The economist would also concede willingly that, if the
current structure were ever changed, that might alter his or her conclusion
as to what substantive rule would then be most efficient. (This is another
example of the inevitable open-endedness of economic analysis.)
For an interpretive theorist, though, the structure of litigation and the
substantive rules are both part of the body of law that must be interpreted,
so any theory that accounts for one but not the other would be lacking from
an interpretive point of view. In tort law, for instance, Jules Coleman has
argued that economic analysis cannot explain why we rely on private
65. See passage quoted supra note 61.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
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litigants to promote deterrence goals (rather than, say, relying on public
enforcement),67 and that this casts doubt on the validity of economics as an
interpretive theory of tort law.68 Once again, the aspiration to broad
coherence pushes interpretive theorists strongly toward an "all-or-nothing"
posture-a posture that is foreign to normative economics but which has
been implicitly adopted by Posner.
Finally, an interpretive theorist would also approve of Posner's search
for an economic theory "of contract law" 69-rather than, say, a theory of
economic welfare more generally, or a theory of overall utility. I mentioned
earlier that Posner's indeterminacy arguments might be even stronger if he
expanded them to take account of economic effects that are usually studied
in literature other than that pertaining directly to contract law-for
example, the literature on litigation costs, on the uncertain administration of
rules and standards, or on the rights of claimants against insolvent debtors. 70
From the external vantage point of economics, all of these are relevant
effects, and their significance is not affected by the fact that some of them
are studied by scholars whose work is not primarily in contract law.
(Similarly, the qualitative distinction between "public" and "private" law-
a distinction that is absolutely essential to someone like Ernest Weinrib7 1-
also has no significance in normative economic analysis.)
From the internal standpoint of an interpretive theory, however, the
law's division of subjects between contract law and other topics is itself one
feature of the subject being interpreted.72 As a result, an interpretive theory
of contract law would normally prefer a theory that accounted for contract
law entirely on the basis of contract concepts and doctrines. Except to the
extent that contract law itself referred to some other body of law, it would
count as a failure (from an interpretive standpoint) if necessary parts of the
theorist's explanation had to be imported from other fields.
In short, there are many reasons to think that economics would fail as
an interpretive theory (were it to aspire to that status) and thus many
reasons for interpretivists to reject economics as unsuited for their
purposes. 73 But this merely underscores my basic point, which is that the
suitability of a theory depends on what it is that the theory is expected to
do. While there are reasons to reject economic analysis as an interpretive
67. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 53, at 3 74-85.
68. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 53, at 30-31.
69. Posner, supra note 1, at 830.
70. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
71. See WEINRIB, supra note 54.
72. Stephen Smith provides a useful discussion of this issue from an interpretive point of
view. See Smith, supra note 62.
73. That is, interpretivists would be right to reject economics as an interpretive theory in its
own right. Of course, to the extent that interpretivists draw on external normative theories in
deciding which interpretation to adopt, see supra note 58, normative economics-like any other
normative theory-could still be used for that purpose.
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theory of law, those reasons do not thereby become grounds for rejecting
economics in its proper use, as a contingent normative theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are, of course, many aspects of Posner's essay that I have not
addressed in this Response. In particular, I have said almost nothing about
those portions of his essay with which I agree (and there are many). I also
have not addressed Posner's speculations about the future prospects for
economic analysis-for example, about whether economics will have to
abandon its assumption of perfect rationality in order to make any
additional progress in analyzing contracts and contract law. 74 The question
of whether economics has succeeded in the past is logically independent
from the question of whether it will continue to succeed in the future, and
nothing I have said even begins to address the latter question.
Instead, I have focused retrospectively on the past thirty years, partly
because this is the primary focus of Posner's own essay, and partly because
it is these claims that, I suspect, will prove most controversial. After all,
assertions that it is time for law and economics to build on its successes by
taking a new direction are not particularly new. 75 But assertions that law
and economics has "failed"-in effect, that it has not succeeded at all in
what ought to be its task-these assertions will attract much more attention.
To be sure, Posner does not claim that law and economics has failed
entirely, for he is careful to note that there have been many successes."
According to Posner, economics has "clarified the policy questions at
stake" and has "ushered in a set of scholarly virtues," so that the contracts
literature now "proceeds at a higher level of sophistication.' 77 But
economics has nevertheless failed at what Posner takes to be its most
important goal, because, as he says, it "fails to explain contract law."' 8 By
this, he means that it has developed neither a descriptive theory that
predicts the actual shape of contract doctrine nor a normative theory
capable of telling us conclusively which rules contract law should adopt.
As should by now be apparent, I believe that Posner has misidentified
the most important goal of economic analysis. The descriptive or predictive
goal is (to me) uninteresting and has already been abandoned by most
74. Posner, supra note 1, at 875-77.
75. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23 (1989). As Ellickson notes
elsewhere, critics of law and economics have been predicting its imminent decline for at least
twenty years. Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 517, 524 (2000) (citing, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 38, at 905).
76. Posner, supra note 1, at 879-80.
77. Id. at 879.
78. Id. at 880.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
current researchers. The interpretive goal might be worth pursuing, but it
too is not the goal that economic researchers pursue. Instead, the normative
goal is the one most often pursued by economists, and that goal does not
demand a fully worked out theory with complete and close-ended answers.
If we instead see the normative goal slightly differently-that is, if we see it
as the goal of shedding as much light as we can on the morally relevant
effects of contract rules, and on the costs and benefits of those effects-
then, by this standard, the past thirty years should count as a success.
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